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Abstract 
Normal social functioning depends on the ability to efficiently and accurately detect 
when someone’s facial expression changes to convey positive or negative emotion. While 
observer mood state has been shown to influence emotion recognition, how variations in 
normal mood might influence sensitivity to the dynamic emergence of expressions has not 
yet been addressed. To investigate this, we modified an existing face morphing paradigm in 
which a central face gradually changes from neutral to expressive (angry, sad, happy, 
surprised). Our sample comprised healthy young adults and current mood state was measured 
using the PANAS-X. Participants pressed a key as soon as they (1) noticed a physical change 
in expression (‘perceptual sensitivity’ – novel task element), and (2) could clearly 
conceptualise which expression was emerging (‘conceptual sensitivity’). A final unspeeded 
response required participants to explicitly label the expression as a measure of recognition 
accuracy. We measured the percent morph (expression intensity) at which a perceptual and 
conceptual change was detected, where greater intensity equates to poorer sensitivity. 
Increased positive mood reduced perceptual and conceptual sensitivity to angry and sad 
expressions only (a mood incongruency effect). Of particular interest, increased negative 
mood decreased conceptual sensitivity for all expressions, but had limited impact on 
perceptual sensitivity. Thus, heightened negative mood is particularly detrimental for 
effectively decoding someone else’s mood change. This may reflect greater introspection and 
consumption of attentional resources directed towards the negative self, leaving fewer 
resources to process emotional signals conveyed by others. This could have important 
consequences for human social interaction.  
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Introduction 
The ability to rapidly detect and accurately decode nonverbal facial cues to emotion is 
crucial for normal social functioning (Blair, 2003). Our own mood state can influence how 
we process emotional expressions conveyed by others. Among healthy individuals, a mood 
congruency effect (Bower, 1981) is found in which expressions are more accurately labelled 
(Schmid & Schmid Mast, 2010), rated as more intense (Bouhuys, Bloem, and Groothuis, 
1995), or perceived to persist longer (Niedenthal, Brauer, Halberstadt, & Innes-Ker, 2001; 
Niedenthal, Halberstadt, Margolin & Innes-Ker, 2000) when the same or similar mood state 
is shared by the observer. More generally, there is evidence that different mood states can 
alter perceptual processing of information. According to Affect-as-Information theory 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 2003), individuals in a negative mood adopt a local information 
processing style (i.e. focus on specific features), while a positive mood leads to the adoption 
of a global information processing style (e.g., Gasper & Clore, 2002; Schmid, Schmid Mast, 
Bombari, Mast, & Lobmaier, 2011). Notably, a global processing style has been shown to be 
important for emotion recognition (e.g., Prkachin, 2003; Schmid et al., 2011). 
The vast majority of studies that have investigated the link between mood and 
emotion processing used static face images. However, during social interaction individuals 
are exposed to frequently changing facial expressions and use this dynamic information to 
monitor intentions and emotional reactions of others. Niedenthal and colleagues (2000, 2001) 
used a dynamic expression changing task to examine sensitivity to the disappearance of 
emotions, but what may be particularly pertinent is the ability to detect the emergence of 
positive and negative expressions. Becker et al. (2012) used a face morph task in which faces 
changed from neutral to happy or angry. They found that healthy participants were faster to 
correctly state that a happy versus angry expression was emerging, suggesting that rapid 
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detection of prosocial signals is important during social interaction. Using a similar dynamic 
task, Joormann and Gotlib (2006) showed that individuals with depression required higher 
levels of expression intensity in order to correctly identify happiness than healthy controls, 
while individuals with social phobia required less expression intensity to identify anger than 
the other groups (see also LeMoult, Joormann, Sherdell, Wright, & Gotlib, 2009). These 
findings indicate that depression reduces sensitivity to positive emotion and social phobia 
heightens sensitivity to threat. In a study of anti-social individuals, Schönenberg, Louis, 
Mayer, and Jusyte (2013) found that violent offenders were less sensitive to the emergence of 
fear and surprise than controls, while detection of the onset of anger, happiness, sadness, and 
disgust were equivalent between groups. Thus, clinical mood and social disorders influence 
sensitivity to dynamic changes in expression in emotion-specific ways. 
What is unknown at present is how natural variations in mood state among the healthy 
population influence sensitivity to the emergence of facial expressions. This is important 
because humans do not function in a neutral vacuum, thus interactions with others may be 
coloured by our own mood. In the current study we utilised the animated face morph task 
used by Joormann and Gotlib (2006) and Schönenberg et al. (2013) in which faces gradually 
changed from neutral to expressive. Our sample comprised healthy young adults whose 
normal, current mood state was measured using the PANAS-X (Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule – Expanded; Watson & Clark, 1994). Furthermore, we adapted the paradigm in 
order to examine two forms of change sensitivity: (1) perceptual sensitivity to lower level 
physical changes in expression; (2) Higher level conceptual sensitivity where the nature and 
meaning of the expression change is fully understood. We reasoned that perceptual sensitivity 
would be driven by the processing of local details, whereas conceptual sensitivity would be 
best served by global processing.  
6 
 
Mood-Congruency theory would predict that perceptual and conceptual sensitivity to 
expression change would be enhanced if participants’ mood shared the valence of the 
emerging facial expression. Affect-as-Information theory would predict two things. First, 
individuals in a negative mood may be particularly sensitive to low-level changes in physical 
detail, and thus require less expression intensity to accurately detect a perceptual change. 
Second, individuals in a positive mood may be particularly sensitive to global changes in 
expression, and thus require less expression intensity to accurately understand the broader 
conceptual change. Our pattern of results fits neither theory adequately, and instead provides 
the novel and interesting finding that higher intensity mood states can reduce perceptual and 
conceptual sensitivity to the emergence of a variety of expressions. 
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METHODS 
Participants 
Forty seven healthy adult participants (23 male, 24 female; mean age 23 years) from 
the University of Aberdeen took part voluntarily or for monetary reimbursement. One dataset 
was excluded due to incorrect use of the response keys. All participants reported no previous 
history of any clinical mood disorders. The study was approved by the School of Psychology 
Ethics Committee. 
Materials and Stimuli 
All tasks were conducted on a Dell Optiplex 780, 1024 x 1280 resolution, using 
Eprime 2.0, and participants were seated approximately 30 cm away from the screen. For the 
animated morph task, digitized colour photographs (421x500 pixels) of three male models 
with hair present (numbers 23, 25, 71) illustrating seven affective states (fear, disgust, angry, 
sad, surprised, happy, neutral) were selected from the Radboud Faces database (Langner et 
al., 2010), as per Schönenberg et al. (2013). The neutral expression was morphed into each of 
the six emotional expressions in 2% increments for every model, using FantaMorph software 
(Abrosoft, China). Thus there were 51 intensity level images in each sequence ranging from 
0% neutral to 100% expressive. Each of the 18 different morph sequences was repeated five 
times throughout the main task. Because morph sequences were repeated, it was important to 
reduce potential learning effects and thus vary the appearance of each morph sequence so that 
the timing of expression change was not fixed (see Schönenberg et al., 2013). To do this, 10 
individual images within each sequence were randomly duplicated to create a sequence 
comprising 61 images. Current mood state was measured using a computerised version of the 
60-item PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994). Participants rated 30 positive and 30 negative 
emotion words to describe how they felt at that moment, on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 
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(extremely). Scores for each item were summed, thus yielding a possible score of between 30 
(low intensity) and 150 (high intensity) for each mood valence. 
Design and Procedure 
First, participants completed the PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994). The animated 
morph task began with 30 practice trials (15 fear, 15 disgust; randomised), followed by the 
main experimental session which comprised 15 trials per expression (angry, sad, happy, 
surprised). Emotional expression and face model were pseudo-randomised in a within-
subjects design. As per Schönenberg et al. (2013), morph images in each sequence were 
presented for 500 ms each in the centre of the screen, starting with the 100% neutral face that 
progressed to the 100% emotional counterpart. In our adapted paradigm, participants were 
first required to press a key as soon as they detected a physical change in expression 
(perceptual sensitivity – a new addition to this paradigm). The morph sequence continued and 
participants were instructed to press another key as soon as they were certain which emotion 
was emerging (conceptual sensitivity, as in the traditional paradigm). On making this 
conceptual response, the morph sequence terminated and participants pressed a labelled key 
to name the emotion (fear/disgust for practice; angry/sad/happy/surprised for main task). This 
final emotion labelling response was not speeded and was used to compute emotion 
recognition accuracy scores.  
Data Analysis 
Mean emotional intensity values (% morph) at the point of key press for both 
perceptual and conceptual responses on correct recognition trials only were used to compute 
a sensitivity index value, where larger values indicate lower sensitivity. The influence of 
participant mood was directly assessed by computing Pearson correlations between mood 
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scores and sensitivity scores for each expression.
1
 In our sample, negative mood scores 
ranged from 33 to 102 (M = 48.41; median = 45.50; SD = 13.72), and positive mood scores 
ranged from 35 to 122 (M = 77.62; median = 76.00; SD = 15.51). 
 
RESULTS 
Recognition Accuracy  
A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of emotion (F(3, 
135) = 14.66, p < .001, ŋp
2
 = .25). Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrected p-values 
showed that participants were significantly poorer in labelling angry expressions (M = 88.85, 
SE = 2.04) compared to happy (M = 98.57, SE = 0.44; p < .001), sad (M = 97.39, SE = 0.83; 
p = .003), and surprise (M = 97.70, SE = 0.69; p = .001). All other comparisons were non-
significant (all ps = 1.00). Poorer labelling of anger versus other emotions among the healthy 
population has been reported previously (Joormann & Gotlib, 2006) so this finding is a 
healthy replication and not unique or unexpected. Mood did not significantly influence 
recognition accuracy (see Table 1 for mood/accuracy correlations). 
Sensitivity to Expression Change 
Perceptual Sensitivity. Mean perceptual sensitivity values were: angry (M = 25.37, SE 
= 1.48), sad (M = 24.14, SE = 1.28), happy (M = 16.76, SE = 0.71), surprised, (M = 16.64, 
                                                          
1 We also assessed the mood of a subsample of 13 participants both before and after 
the practice session, in order to check whether viewing fear and disgust faces during practice 
inadvertently altered mood before the main task began. We found no reliable support for this 
(p = .50 and p= .18 for positive and negative mood score differences pre- versus post- 
practice). 
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SE = 0.92). All correlations between negative mood and perceptual sensitivity scores were 
non-significant (see Table 1). However, increased positive mood significantly decreased 
perceptual sensitivity to a change in both angry (r(44) = .33, p = .027) and sad (r(44) = .39, p 
= .007) expressions (Figures 1a and 1b respectively). Correlations between positive mood 
and sensitivity to happy or surprised expressions were non-significant (Table 1).  
Conceptual Sensitivity. Mean conceptual sensitivity values were: angry (M = 37.71, 
SE = 1.51), sad (M = 34.12, SE = 1.13), happy (M = 22.96, SE = 0.77), surprised (M = 25.98, 
SE = 0.84). Increased negative mood significantly decreased conceptual sensitivity to a 
change in both angry (r(44) = .39, p = .008) and sad (r(44) = .47, p = .001) expressions 
(Figures 1c and 1d respectively). There were also weaker correlations between increased 
negative mood and reduced sensitivity to changes in happy (r(44) = .28, p = .060; Figure 1e) 
and surprised (r(44) = .28, p = .060; Figure 1f) expressions. Thus, heightened negative mood 
decreased the ability to accurately conceptualise the emergence of all expressions to some 
degree. In contrast, increased positive mood significantly reduced conceptual sensitivity to a 
change in angry (r(44) = .35, p = .018) and sad (r(44) = .42, p = .004) expressions (Figures 
1g and 1h respectively), but had little impact on sensitivity to happy or surprised expressions 
(Table 1).  
Table 1 about here 
Figure 1 about here 
We also note that perceptual and conceptual changes took longer to detect in negative 
than positive expressions (happy vs. angry/sad and surprised vs. angry/sad, all Bonferroni 
corrected ps < .001). Given the notion that threat signals should be particularly salient, it is 
perhaps surprising that we find lower sensitivity to negative versus positive expressions. 
However, our findings replicate the happy advantage consistently found among healthy adults 
in the traditional version of our task (Becker et al., 2012; Joormann & Gotlib, 2006; 
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Schönenberg et al., 2013). Becker et al. (2012) suggest that the emergence of a happy 
expression may be more readily detected due to expansion properties of happy facial features 
(neutral to angry involves contraction). The same could apply to surprise here. However, our 
expressions changed more slowly than those in Becker et al’s (2012) study, and perceptual 
sensitivity to surprise was similar to happy (p = .805), so this interpretation is provided with 
caution. On a more conceptual level, Becker and Srinivasan (2014) propose that prosocial 
communication is essential for human development and evolution, and that happy 
expressions are salient for this reason. Supporting this, conceptual sensitivity was 
significantly higher for happy than surprised expressions (p = .001), suggesting that happy 
signals are rapidly decoded at a deeper, more meaningful level. 
Finally, to assess whether there were any speed-accuracy trade-offs, correlations were 
computed between conceptual sensitivity values (i.e., the point at which they understood 
which expression had emerged – this response terminated the sequence) and recognition 
accuracy scores (response made immediately after). There was a significant negative 
correlation between accuracy and sensitivity for angry faces (r (44) = -.520, p< .001) 
indicating that waiting for more expression information to appear was related to poorer, not 
better, accuracy. No other correlations reached significance (all ps > .12), thus there is no 
evidence for any speed-accuracy trade-off. 
DISCUSSION 
To summarise, we find modest support for mood congruency theory and no support 
for Affect-As-Information theory. Our results show evidence of a partial mood incongruency 
effect in which increased positive mood reduced perceptual and conceptual sensitivity to the 
emergence of angry and sad expressions only. However, increased negative mood did not 
similarly reduce sensitivity to the emergence of positive expressions only. 
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Our key finding was that while heightened negative mood had little impact on perceptual 
sensitivity for any expression, it served to reduce conceptual sensitivity (the point at which 
participants were sure what expression had emerged) to all expressions to varying degrees: 
strongly for negative and modestly for positive expressions. This may be best interpreted 
according to theories of attentional resource allocation. It is widely accepted that we have a 
limited capacity attentional resource (Kahneman, 1973), and thus have to distribute our 
resources as efficiently as possible according to both internal and external demands. Ellis and 
Ashbrook’s (1988) resource allocation model posits that the amount of resource that can be 
allocated to external tasks is regulated by a person’s emotional state. Increasingly intense 
moods are thought to increase irrelevant thoughts which then compete for resources required 
to undertake other relevant cognitive activities. While this model refers more specifically to 
memory, it is conceivable that the ability to more generally monitor external events is 
similarly influenced by mood, especially when external observations are social and emotional 
in nature. Our study suggests that while heightened states of both positive and negative 
moods may consume larger portions of resource, being in a negative mood state may be 
particularly resource intensive, with greater introspection and self-directed attention leading 
to reduced capacity for processing a wider variety of socio-emotional signals transmitted by 
others. Greater introspection and less regard for others is maladaptive: reduced sensitivity to 
threat signals can impair communication and could endanger one’s emotional and physical 
welfare, while reduced sensitivity to others’ expressions of sadness or despair is not 
conducive to empathic relations. Decreased sensitivity to a smile is disadvantageous for 
prosocial communication and connection with others, while impaired ability to detect and 
decode surprise – a form of readiness for action (Kringelbach & Phillips, 2014) - could delay 
reciprocal behaviour. 
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In conclusion, our findings draw attention to how sensitivity to others’ emotions can 
be influenced by normal variations in our current mood state. The results help advance 
theories of mood and emotion processing, and deepen our understanding of normal social 
human interaction.  
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Figure and Table Captions 
Figure 1. These scatterplots show correlations between: Positive Mood and Perceptual 
Sensitivity to the emergence of Angry (a) and Sad (b) expressions; Negative Mood and 
Conceptual Sensitivity to the emergence of Angry (c), Sad (d), Happy (e), and Surprised (f) 
expressions; Positive Mood and Conceptual Sensitivity to the emergence of Angry (g) and 
Sad (h) expressions. Perceptual sensitivity was defined as the % morph (expression intensity) 
at which a physical change in expression was detected. Conceptual sensitivity was defined as 
the % morph (expression intensity) at which participants were confident which expression 
had emerged. All figures show a positive correlation where increased mood intensity served 
to reduce sensitivity. 
 
Table 1. Correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r) between Mood scores and 
Perceptual/Conceptual Sensitivity values, and between Mood scores and Recognition 
Accuracy scores. Correlation is significant at p < .01 (**); correlation is significant at p < .05 
(*). Values in italics denote a marginally significant correlation p < .09. 
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Table 1 
 Perceptual Sensitivity Conceptual Sensitivity Recognition Accuracy 
 Angry Sad Hap Surp Angry Sad Hap Surp Angry Sad Hap Surp 
Negative 
Mood 
.25 .21 .05 .03 .39** .47** .28 .28 -.06 .03 -.25 -.24 
Positive 
Mood 
.33* .39** .21 .19 .35* .42** .05 .15 -.23 .12 -.15 -.21 
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Figure 1 
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